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INTRODUCTION
In October 1995, a twenty-three-year-old Cape Verdean named Bobby
Mendes was stabbed in the heart in the Dorchester neighborhood of Boston
His death at the hands of another Cape Verdean created a rift in the local com-
munity, sparking a street war between two neighborhood gangs known as
Stonehurst and Wendover. The conflict ultimately produced the worst period
of spontaneous, ruthless violence in Boston since the Irish gang wars of the
196os, as each gang sought revenge for past slights and systematically murdered
witnesses who could testify to its own members' crimes.' Dorchester became a
"virtual shooting gallery" for much of a decade as the escalating mayhem and
indiscriminate gunfire claimed dozens of lives.' In an effort to stem the vio-
lence, federal authorities targeted gang members for prosecution under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, better known as RICO.4
In 2004, three members of the Stonehurst gang were indicted for violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 5 a RICO provision that criminalizes racketeering activi-
ties by members of an enterprise "engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce."6 Their subsequent convictions tested the outer
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1. Kevin Cullen, A Dozen Bloody Years and An Arrest: Pursuing the Case That Tore at
Boston's Cape Verdeans, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2007, at Al; see also John R. Elle-
ment, 13 Years Later, Lopes Describes Slaying, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2008, at B2.
2. See Cullen, supra note 1; see also United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 33 (1st
Cir. 2007).
3- Cullen, supra note I; Ellement, supra note I.
4. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 31.
5. See id. at 30.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
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limits of Congress's Article I Commerce Clause power.7 Just a month earlier, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had overturned a convic-
tion based on similar charges in Waucaush v. United States.' Relying on the Su-
preme Court's "new federalism" jurisprudence-expressed most prominently
in United States v. Lopez9 and United States v. Morrison'-the Waucaush court
held that members of a street gang not "involved in any sort of economic enter-
prise" could not be convicted of RICO offenses unless the gang's activities had a
"substantial" effect on interstate commerce." In 2007, after the three Stonehurst
members appealed their convictions using a similar argument in the case of
United States v. Nascimento, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit rejected Waucaush's conclusions. 2 Instead, the First Circuit concluded
that prosecutors only needed to prove that Stonehurst had a de minimis effect
on interstate commerce. 3
The resulting circuit split goes to the heart of the Supreme Court's recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and has critical implications for federal au-
thorities' ability to combat organized crime. This Comment argues that RICO
encompasses racketeering activities by members of street gangs, even if the
gangs themselves have only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Thus,
gang members could be convicted of a RICO offense so long as prosecutors
demonstrated, for instance, that the gang had disrupted the activities of busi-
nesses operating in interstate commerce,14 transported newly purchased weap-
ons across state lines," or engaged in the sale or purchase of illegal drugs. 6
This reading comports with the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause au-
thority following the Supreme Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Raich,'7 which clari-
fied Congress's power to regulate purely intrastate activity in pursuance of a
larger, permissible interstate policy. Raich's role is crucial because it emphasized
the federal government's authority to prohibit conduct that is itself only mini-
mally connected to interstate commerce, as long as the prohibition is a compo-
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 2004).
9. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
10. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
11. Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 256.
12. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2007).
13. Id. at 37-40.
14. See id. at 43-44.
15. See id. at 45.
16. See Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 257; United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140 (6th Cir.
1996); 4f United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 953 (gth Cir. 2004) (holding
that the federal government could criminalize conspiracy to steal cocaine from
narcotics traffickers).
17. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
500
27:499 2009
RICO AFTER RAICH: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF STREET GANGS
nent of a larger scheme regulating activities that are substantially related to in-
terstate commerce. The case undoubtedly influenced the First Circuit's subse-
quent decision in Nascimento,8 and, if issued earlier, it may have even altered
the Sixth Circuit's approach in Waucaush, which predated the Raich ruling. Yet
Raich was merely the clearest expression of a principle that had been embraced
by the Court since Lopez, and the Sixth Circuit gave too short shrift to the ear-
lier expressions of the Raich doctrine. Under Raich, Congress possesses the
power to eradicate street gangs because they often facilitate the activities of in-
terstate criminal organizations and sometimes develop into criminal groups
with interstate and even international reach.
I. THE LONG REACH OF RICO
Now considered perhaps the most powerful weapon in the federal govern-
ment's effort to combat street gangs,19 RICO was created with a broad purpose
in mind. Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 197o,"° which had as its stated goal "the eradication of organized crime in
the United States."'" Congress found that organized crime was
a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annu-
ally drains billions of dollars from America's economy[,] ... weaken[s]
the stability of the Nation's economic system.... seriously burden[s]
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten[s] the domestic security,
and undermine[s] the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens."
Although this expansive understanding of organized crime clearly included
large hierarchical organizations like the American Mafia, Congress purposefully
left RICO's language flexible enough to encompass a wide array of smaller and
less professional groups."3 Indeed, Congress was so concerned that RICO be
18. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 41 (1st Cir. 2007).
19. Joseph Alesia & John Lausch, Use of Federal Statutes To Attack Street Gangs, U.S.
ATT'Ys' BULL., July 2008, at 15, 23.
20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (2006)).
21. Id. at 923.
22. Id. at 922-23.
23. The Organized Crime Control Act's principal sponsor in the Senate, John Little
McClellan, stated that the Act would apply lessons learned from the nation's ex-
perience with large-scale organized crime to a broader range of criminal activities.
See 116 CONG. REc. 18,913 (1970). Similarly, House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Emanuel Celler stated during debate that RICO's scope "was left flexible." 116
CONG. REC. 35,302 (1970).
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adaptable to a wide range of criminal activity that it inserted a clause specifying
that courts should construe RICO's provisions liberally.
"4
RICO-based criminal charges are most often brought under § 1962(c), 2 5
which encompasses a wide range of racketeering activity-a term broadly de-
fined to include acts of murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
obstruction of justice, and other crimes." This provision imposes harsh crimi-
nal and civil penalties on any person who "through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" conducts or participates in the affairs of an enterprise engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce.2 7 The federal courts of appeals that have ad-
dressed the provision's interstate commerce requirement generally have held
that it demands only a minimal connection between the underlying racketeer-
ing acts and interstate commerce28
In rejecting this consensus by interpreting RICO to require a "substantial"
connection between street gangs and interstate commerce, Waucaush neglected
the principle that a single statutory term should generally be given a consistent
meaning.2 9 In essence, the Sixth Circuit found that section 1962(c)'s require-
ment that a RICO enterprise "affect... interstate or foreign commerce" was
two-tiered. RICO enterprises that "engage in economic activity" need have only
a de minimis effect on interstate commerce, the court concluded, but organiza-
tions that do not engage in economic activity-like most street gangs-must
demonstrate a "substantial" connection to interstate commerce." The court ar-
rived at this curious result by invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance,31 which provides that when a statute is susceptible of multiple
24. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) ("The provisions of this title
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."). The Supreme
Court has recognized this clause's importance in applying RICO to a broad range
of racketeering activities. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98
(1985).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006); see Lee Applebaum, Is There a Good Faith Claim for the
RICO Enterprise PlaintiffP, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 519, 521-22 (2002); Randy D.
Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice: A Reexamination of RICO's Nexus Require-
ments Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c), 32 VT. L. REV. 171, 173 (2007).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (20o6).
27. Id. § 1962(c).
28. See United States v. Delgado, 4o F.3d 290, 297 (sth Cir. 2005); United States v.
Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d
1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 674 (2d Cir. 1997);
United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996).
29. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) ("A term appearing in several
places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears....
We have even stronger cause to construe a single formulation.., the same way
each time it is called into play.").
30. See Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2004).
31. See id. at 255.
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constructions, a court should interpret the statute in a manner that will not
raise "grave and doubtful" constitutional questions. 2 Finding that RICO's ap-
plication to street gangs with only minimal connections to interstate commerce
would raise such constitutional doubts, the Waucaush court simply read its
two-tiered structure into the statute.
But the legislative history and text of RICO make its proper interpretation
clear: It is a means to attack organized crime at all levels by prohibiting the op-
erations of myriad criminal organizations, including those (like street gangs)
operating at a relatively low degree of sophistication. As the Supreme Court has
noted: "Congress knew what it was doing when it adopted commodious lan-
guage capable of extending beyond organized crime.... Congress drafted RICO
broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many
different forms and likely to attract a broad array of perpetrators operating in
many different ways."33
Congress, in other words, was intentionally vague. It hoped to create a stat-
ute flexible enough to impose criminal and civil sanctions on any racketeering-
influenced enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Accordingly, where Con-
gress has failed to indicate explicitly that a certain class of enterprise apparently
encompassed by the text should be excluded from RICO liability, the Supreme
Court has generally held that RICO liability applies.3 4 To interpret RICO's
broad language as an indication of uncertainty about the meaning of the stat-
ute, and thus justify constraints on RICO's scope under the constitutional
avoidance doctrine, would be to subvert the very reasons for Congress's adop-
tion of that language in the first place. As the Court has stated, "[t] he fact that
RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."3"
II. THE "NEW" NEW FEDERALISM? RICO AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AFTER
RAICH
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce...
among the several States" and "[t] o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
32. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000).
33. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 246, 248-49 (1989); see also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (recognizing this language's impor-
tance in applying RICO to a broad range of racketeering activities).
34. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 51o U.S. 249, 261 (1994) (holding that
RICO does not require that the underlying activity have an economic purpose,
based in part upon the lack of any such requirement in the statute's text); United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 58o-81 (1981) (holding that RICO applies to ile-
gitimate as well as legitimate enterprises, because Congress did not distinguish be-
tween the two in the text).
35. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747
F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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proper for carrying into Execution" this authority.36 In concluding that RICO's
application to street gangs with only a minimal connection to interstate com-
merce would have exceeded this authority, the Sixth Circuit relied principally37
on United States v. Morrison, in which the Supreme Court held that Congress
had exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by creating a federal civil action
for victims of gender-motivated violence."8 Morrison built on the foundations
established in United States v. Lopez, which held that Congress's admittedly
broad Commerce Clause power did not extend to regulation of noneconomic
firearm-related crimes that did not, in the aggregate, "substantially affect[]" in-
terstate commerce.
3 9
RICO, however, differs markedly from the laws struck down in Lopez and
Morrison. Those decisions invalidated statutes that lacked jurisdictional ele-
ments requiring the government to demonstrate a connection to interstate
commerce in each case40 that relied on an attenuated rather than substantial
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce,4' and that
were based on expansive readings of the Commerce Clause that would federal-
ize large areas of criminal law traditionally under state control.42 RICO, of
course, contains just the sort of jurisdictional element the Court found lacking
in Lopez and Morrison. More importantly, the Court's remaining concerns are
inapplicable to RICO because it is not, like the laws at issue in those cases, an
assertion of authority over a wide swath of purely noncommercial intrastate ac-
tivity.
RICO is, instead, a regulatory scheme targeting organized criminal activi-
ties as a whole, which sweeps some intrastate activity into its ambit in further-
ance of its overall objective. As Lopez itself recognized, such schemes are
permissible even when they require some regulation of intrastate activity with
minimal connections to interstate commerce: What matters for constitutional
purposes is that the larger scheme be directed at an activity with a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 43 There can be no doubt that organized crime, in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 44
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18.
37. See Waucaush v. United States, 38o F.3d 251, 256-58 (6th Cir. 2004).
38. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
39. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-6o (1995).
40. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
41. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
42. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
43. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (noting that the invalidated statute "is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated"); id. at 558 ("(The
Court has said.., that where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial rela-
tion to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
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The Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion only by relying heavily on
the Morrison Court's "reject[ion of] the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggre-
gate effect on interstate commerce." 45 But this language has no application to a
more general regulatory scheme like RICO. It applies, in the Court's own
words, only to regulation of criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's im-
pact on interstate commerce. Lopez established, however, that a larger legislative
scheme may reach intrastate activity with only a minimal connection to inter-
state commerce, based upon the substantial effect on interstate commerce of
the activity the scheme seeks to regulate in general. Such is the essential implica-
tion of Congress's constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper
to the execution of its commerce power; a legislative scheme governing inter-
state commerce would be ineffective without the ability to regulate areas of tra-
ditional state concern that influence the success of the larger scheme. A
congressional effort to eradicate drug trafficking, for instance, would be practi-
cally hopeless without the accompanying authority to criminalize wholly intra-
state possession of drugs.4
6
The Supreme Court relied on this principle for its holding in Gonzales v.
Raich, which reinforced Congress's power to regulate some intrastate activity as
part of a wider regulatory scheme.47 The respondents in Raich were users of lo-
cally-grown marijuana that was prescribed to them pursuant to state law. The
Court rejected their contention that the federal government overstepped its
Commerce Clause authority by regulating their activities as part of its larger ef-
fort to combat the drug trade. Instead, the Court held that Congress could regu-
late intrastate activity if it rationally concluded that such activity was "an
essential part of the larger regulatory scheme."' The Court determined that the
respondents' marijuana use, although entirely local, "tend[ed] to frustrate" the
legitimate federal objective of eliminating the interstate drug market and was
therefore subject to federal regulation. 49 The Raich standard is highly deferen-
that statute is of no consequence.") (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197
n.27 (1968) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)).
44. See Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970)
(statement of findings).
45. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617, quoted in Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 256
(6th Cir. 2004).
46. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. 2, § lOl, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970)
(codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 8oi(6) (West 2008)) (finding that "[flederal control of
the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the ef-
fective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic").
47. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 19, 22; cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (reaching similar conclu-
sions with respect to the cultivation of wheat).
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tial: Courts must provide "a strong presumption of validity" to a congressional
judgment that exempting certain behavior (like homegrown medical marijuana
use or intrastate gang activity) would "undermine the orderly enforcement of
the entire regulatory scheme."5
There is thus no absolute constitutional requirement that the violent activi-
ties of street gangs-as one manifestation of the organized criminal activity
regulated by RICO-be prosecuted only upon a showing that the individual
gangs themselves have a substantial connection to interstate commerce. The
only remaining question is whether Congress in fact could reasonably have con-
cluded that exempting street gang activity from RICO would have "under-
mine[d] the orderly enforcement" of RICO in its entirety." Because such a
conclusion was justified for the reasons explained below, Lopez and Raich re-
quire only that street gangs subject to RICO liability have a de minimis connec-
tion to interstate commerce.
III. STREET SWEEPING: A PROACTIVE RICO-BASED APPROACH TO FIGHTING
ORGANIZED CRIME
Gang activity is increasingly national in scope and continues to expand. 2
As of September 20o8, an estimated i million people belonged to over 20,000
gangs spread throughout the United States.53 Gangs are becoming more violent
and sophisticated, blurring the line between simple street gangs and traditional
organized crime. Federal and state law enforcement agencies now report coop-
eration between local street gangs and more complex organized crime groups,
particularly drug cartels operating along the U.S.-Mexican border.5 4 Yet state
and local prosecutors are too pressed for time and lacking in resources to pur-
sue the lengthy investigations necessary to dismantle an entire gang; state prose-
cutions of gang members usually involve stand-alone indictments for single
offenses, like murder or armed robbery.55
A growing body of research on the evolution of gangs suggests that the
broad distribution and widened scope of street gang activity is no accident.
Criminologists have theorized that gangs can be grouped into three classes:
first-generation gangs that are localized, unsophisticated, primarily motivated by
a desire to protect their own turf, and engaged in an array of opportunistic
criminal activity; second-generation gangs that are more cohesive, more central-
ized, and focused on cornering the drug market rather than protecting turf; and
50. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 28.
51. Id.
52. NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2009 iii
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 NGTA].
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
55. See James M. Trusty, Gang Prosecution, 41 MD. B.J. 4, 6 (2008).
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third-generation gangs that are highly sophisticated, transnational, and willing to
commit acts of terrorism to seize or maintain political or financial power. 6 Not
all gangs evolve to the next generation, but those that do generate increasing
levels of violence and instability and are more likely to affiliate themselves with
international drug trafficking rings.57 Indeed, some of the most violent gangs
operating in the United States today originated as neighborhood-level street
gangs5
8
The widespread, dynamic, and increasingly international threat demon-
strated by American gangs demands a flexible national response. While first-
generation gangs standing alone may not fall within Congress's power to regu-
late interstate commerce, the relatively more market-oriented second- and
third-generation gangs certainly do. To require the federal government to wait
until street gangs like Stonehurst have evolved into national or transnational
threats is to hamstring any attempt at an effective national policy of gang con-
trol. A proactive approach involving RICO prosecutions of violent first-
generation gangs, however, would save time and money by allowing investiga-
tors to dismantle such groups before they adopt more sophisticated means of
evading law enforcement. This approach would also undercut street gangs that
support more sophisticated criminal groups; in 2005, more than a quarter of
American law enforcement agencies reported that gangs were cooperating with
organized crime entities in their jurisdictions.
5 9
It is true that such a framework could sweep up many first-generation
gangs that would never have evolved into more serious threats, but this over-
inclusion is not the deciding factor under Raich. The test established by the Su-
preme Court is only whether it would be rational for Congress to conclude that
the eradication of organized crime on a national scale required the regulation of
street gang activity. Of course, it would be impractical for the federal govern-
ment to prosecute large numbers of first-generation gangs, even if it had to
prove merely that those gangs had at least a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce. But prosecutors could exercise their discretion to target only those
56. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT No. RL34233, THE MS-13 AND 18TH STREET
GANGS: EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS? 4-5 (2008) [hereinafter
TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS]; John P. Sullivan, Third Generation Street
Gangs: Turf, Cartels and NetWarriors, 13 CRIME & JUST. INT'L (1997), available at
http://www.cjcenter.org/cjcenter/publications/cji/archives/cji.php?id=543; John P.
Sullivan & Robert J. Bunker, Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords, in NON-
STATE THREATS AND FUTURE WARS 40, 48-50 (Robert J. Bunker ed., 2003).
57. 2009 NGTA, supra note 52, at 13; MAX G. MANWARING, STREET GANGS: THE NEW
URBAN INSURGENCY 11 (2005), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pdffiles/PUB597.pdf.
58. Examples include Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) and the i8th Street Gang, both
recognized as emerging transnational threats. See NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG IN-
VESTIGATORS ASS'NS, 2005 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT 8-9, 17 (2005)
[hereinafter 2005 NGTA]; TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS, supra note 56, at 2-4.
59. 2005 NGTA, supra note 58, at 2.
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gangs with the strongest ties to organized crime or the strongest likelihood of
evolving into more dangerous criminal threats. On the other hand, if they left
first-generation gangs untouched while targeting more sophisticated threats,
authorities would ensure a constant supply of entrepreneurial criminals ready
to fill the profitable niche left vacant by the dismantling of more complex gangs.
The Commerce Clause cannot be so restrictive that it prevents Congress from
targeting a national threat at its source, rather than at its severest manifesta-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Raich merely bolstered the principle announced in Lopez that the intrastate
character of essential parts of an interstate regulatory scheme should not pre-
vent the federal government from applying its superior resources to combat
threats of national or transnational dimensions. This principle has important
implications for a wide range of federal law enforcement activities, from immi-
gration enforcement to the war on drugs. Both immigration and the war on
drugs, furthermore, have ambitious goals that may significantly depend on
Congress's ability to regulate intrastate conduct. The Court designed its new
federalism jurisprudence to prevent the federal government from usurping the
traditional role played by state law enforcement, not to hamstring national re-
sponses to national or international problems. Of course, courts should care-
fully scrutinize any federal encroachment on the traditional authority of the
states. But where Congress has reasonably determined that a national criminal
problem requires a uniform national response in areas of traditional state au-
thority, the Commerce Clause-to that limited extent-poses no obstacle.
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